Policy Note No. 5

Casualties of Lebanon Include Israel's Prowess, US Policy

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 ushered in an unbalanced Lebanese-Israeli cessation of hostilities that was shaky as of the first day. Will the resolution help Israel achieve the political objectives it failed to achieve militarily? How will accountability for the terrible costs of this war be assigned? How does it affect United States policy in the Middle East? The Institute's Senior Fellow Nadia Hijab addresses these questions.

A UN Resolution that May Renew Conflict

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1701 on August 11 after amendments to an earlier US-French draft. As a result of Lebanese and Arab objections, the resolution no longer calls for a cessation of hostilities that leaves Israeli troops in Lebanon, and it now includes mention of the Shaba' Farms and Lebanese prisoners. Under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter it gives an expanded UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon) the power to use force to support the Lebanese army, but it does not specifically mandate it to disarm Hizballah. The text also notes the need to implement past resolutions to end Israel's occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights and the Palestinian territories for a "comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

However, the resolution contains much that is unbalanced or vague. It calls for the immediate cessation of "all attacks" by Hizballah but only of "all offensive military operations" by Israel. As Lebanon's Acting Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri wryly told the Security Council, "The Lebanese are not confident in [an] Israeli distinction between 'defensive' and 'offensive.'" (1) The text only provides for "phased withdrawal" of Israeli troops and Israel has given mixed signals on how it interprets this. Some officials say Israel could be out of Lebanon within 10 days, others that it could take months. Israel's planes daily violate Lebanese airspace, and it maintains its land and sea blockade.

For its part, Hizballah supported the deployment of the Lebanese army backed by UNIFIL, but maintained its "natural right to resist" so long as Israeli troops "are practicing an occupation and acts of aggression." (2) Having stood its military ground, Hizballah will not agree to dismantle its positions while Israel remains in Lebanon, nor is the Lebanese government likely to be able to do so. Thus, while resolution 1701 ended large-scale death and destruction, it leaves a door open to renewed conflict.

Accountability for the Bloodshed

The question of who is responsible for the loss of life and destruction will be the focus of attention in the coming days. Preliminary estimates of human and material losses are:

- Lebanon 12 July - 14 August. Casualties: 1,110 civilians killed. Destruction: 29 ports, airports, water and sewage treatment plants, power plants; 630 roads; 23 fuel stations; 73 bridges; 7,000 private homes; 900 businesses and farms. (3) Estimates of Hizballah fighters killed range from 100 to 600.

- Israel 12 July - 13 August. Casualties: 43 civilians, 114 soldiers killed. (4) Destruction: dozens of homes, public buildings, businesses, and forests. (5)

Resolution 1701 does not recognize the possibility of Lebanese claims against Israel for what was, under international law, a disproportionate response to the Hizballah capture of Israeli soldiers on July 12 to force negotiations on a prisoner exchange. Another problematic aspect of the resolution from this standpoint is the attempt to assign Hizballah responsibility for the conflict in the first preambular paragraph.

Meanwhile, in the Palestinian Gaza Strip, which has received little coverage during the Israel-Lebanon war, some 200 Palestinians, including 44 children, have been killed since 25 June, when Israel launched an offensive against Gaza after Palestinian guerrillas captured an Israeli solider to negotiate a prisoner exchange. (6) In fact, July saw the highest number of Palestinians killed in Gaza since October 2004.

Did the US Have Its Own Lebanon Goals?

The explanations for Israel's decision to escalate what could have been just another border skirmish into all-out war include: the desire to re-establish its image of military superiority, dented by its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000; eliminating Hizballah's military infrastructure, if not the movement as a whole; and eliminating the last pockets of Arab resistance - Hizballah and Hamas - before setting Israel's final borders in the West Bank. Middle East observers add some US objectives: a "trial run" against Iran and neutralizing a potential threat to Israel's northern flank before a possible offensive on Iran. (7) US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's July 21 remarks about the "birth pangs" of a new Middle East were widely seen in the region as highlighting a major US objective. The fact that the US Administration held out against a cease-fire until three weeks into the conflict lends credence to such arguments.

In spite of President George Bush and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's attempts to paint a glowing victory, Israel's own politicians and public believe its objectives were not met. (8) Many in the Middle East believe Hizballah's resistance has countered US plans. Indeed, the US faces a very different Middle East, one in which "moderate" countries will find it even harder to take pro-American positions. Although the penultimate paragraph of resolution 1701 may have just been window dressing, the US would do well to understand how the majority views a just and comprehensive peace if it wants to maintain any influence in the Arab region.

(1) See http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm for statements and the text of 1701.

(2) Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah to Hizballah's Al Manar TV August 12; see 14 August 2006 mideastwire.com

(3) http://www.lebanonundersiege.gov.lb/english

(4) http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa

(5) "Israel begins to tally costs of the fighting," The New York Times, 15 August 2006

(6) http://www.pchrgaza.org/index.htm

(7) See, e.g. "Washington's Interests in Israel's war," Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, 14 August 2006.

(8) 52% believed Israeli troops had been unsuccessful in Lebanon according to a poll quoted in "Israel's verdict: We lost the war," The Independent, 13 August 2006.
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Additional research by the Institute's intern Lauren Bayer.

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