This article was originally published by Bitterlemons.org and is republished with permission.

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh waves to supporters in the Rafah refugee camp in southern Gaza. (Hatem Omar, Maan Images)

Ever since Hamas emerged as a resistance force against the Israeli occupation in the occupied Palestinian territories during the first intifada, Israel has worked relentlessly to deepen the rift between Hamas as an emerging power and Fateh, traditionally considered the backbone of the national struggle.

Palestinians well remember how, at the beginning of the first intifada, Israeli security forces closed their eyes to Hamas members distributing propaganda on behalf of their group. Israel clearly thought that allowing Hamas space to work would undermine the status of the PLO as the political umbrella of all Palestinians and would threaten the political program of the PLO adopted in 1988 in Algiers regarding a Palestinian state.

Some now say that the Israeli efforts against the PLO then failed. Others argue that it was the solid position of the unified national command of that intifada--consisting of all the factions and independent national figures--as well as the emergence of Hamas as a force on the Palestinian scene that caused the Fateh-led PLO leadership to feel threatened, thus leading to the Oslo accords that refocused attention on the role of the PLO and its leadership.

Regardless, Israel used the Oslo accords and the "peace process" to divide Palestinians between those skeptical, those optimistic and those directly benefiting without having any intention of achieving actual progress. On the contrary, Israel worked very hard to undermine the credibility of the PA by making promises and not keeping them.

The moment of truth came at Camp David in 2000 when Israel proved that it would never recognize Palestinian national rights. Israel realized then that Yasser Arafat would not deliver what it and the United States wanted and could be very harmful to the Israeli scheme of keeping the Palestinians divided without any clear strategy or goal. On the Palestinian side, the failure of Camp David led to deeper frustration and despair and caused the outbreak of the second intifada.

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With the removal of Arafat from the political scene and the election of Mahmoud Abbas, Israel became hopeful again that Palestinians would remain split. President Abbas rejects the armed nature of the intifada and is known for his adamant support for popular and peaceful resistance and political negotiations to achieve Palestinian national rights.

Since Hamas subsequently won parliamentary elections, Israel and the international community ensured that the Islamist group would never stand a chance of actually running the affairs of the Palestinian people. At the same time, Israel has reverted to its old technique of making promises to Fateh that it does not keep.

Thus, Israel is killing three birds with one stone. It is weakening Fateh and Abu Mazen by undermining their credibility in making promises it has no intention of keeping. The continued incursions and assassinations of militants in the West Bank after the agreement on wanted men was signed and the refusal to remove a single checkpoint in spite of promising to ease travel restrictions in the West Bank are prominent examples. It is weakening Hamas by attacking the group in the Gaza Strip through near-daily military raids and is doing so without any protest from the international community. And finally, having divided the West Bank and Gaza, it is arguing that there is no leader strong enough to take control should Israel leave occupied Palestinian territory.

Meanwhile, Israel is working hard to preempt any chance of Fateh-Hamas reconciliation. After a recent visit of the Japanese foreign minister, Abbas made a statement that many interpreted as a softening of his stance against talks with Hamas, calling on the group to return to "national unity". Hamas immediately responded by welcoming the statement and inviting Abbas to Gaza for talks. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, however, issued a warning that any Fateh-Hamas reconciliation would end the "diplomatic process" he and Abbas are currently engaged in and noting that Abbas was "well aware" of this.

Israel claims it wants to strengthen Abbas against what it calls the anti-peace forces of Hamas. But, as several observers have pointed out, if Israel really wants to strengthen Abbas the way is clear. It can announce that it intends to end the occupation; it can freeze settlement expansions and stop building the wall in the West Bank. If Israel should take such steps, Abbas would, in the words of former Minister of Information Mustapha Barghouti, be the "hero of all Palestinians".

But Israel appears to have other designs. It wants a Palestinian Authority with authority only to control its people rather than any land and that will act as Israel's policeman. Indeed, this is what Israel wanted from the Oslo accords in the first place.

The international meeting called for by US President George W. Bush on the Middle East in the autumn and the Israeli decision to attend are only the latest installment of this soap opera. In the best-case scenario, Abbas will get yet another "concrete" promise of a Palestinian state, but with no borders and no control. Hamas will criticize him for attending and Palestinian divisions will continue. For its part, Israel can sit back and relax, secure in the knowledge that, just as before, it can continue making empty promises, but this time with no blowback since Palestinians are divided against themselves.

Khader Khader is a media analyst with the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center.