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Ali Jarbawi, Bitterlemons.org, Jun 5, 2008 This article was originally published by Bitterlemons.org and is republished with permission.
To examine whether Olmert's scandal and disappearance from the political scene will negatively affect these negotiations, one should examine Israel's intent for engaging in the first place. Is Israel really interested in reaching a settlement with its Palestinian and Arab neighbors, or does it want to impose a settlement on them according to its own terms? Does Israel participate in these negotiations out of a conviction that they are the proper and only channel to reach a settlement, or is there a hidden motive for carrying on negotiations on all of these tracks? First, it is rather obvious from past experience that Israel, irrespective of the composition of its government, is only interested in forcing a settlement to the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Therefore, negotiations on three out of four of these tracks (the one with Hizballah is rather "technical" in nature) are not intended to yield results unless of course the other parties cede to Israel's demands. Should this happen, negotiations would be deemed a success. Whatever the outcome, the negotiating tracks are being used by Olmert's government, as they were used by previous Israeli governments, to gain time to create facts on the ground to impose Israeli conditions.
Second, the widest national consensus in Israel now is not on achieving peace with the Palestinians or Syrians but rather on protecting Israel from the "Iranian threat". Therefore, it could be argued that the real intent of at least two out of the four negotiating tracks (with Hamas and Syria) is not to conclude lasting agreements, but rather to try and deconstruct regional alliances with Iran before launching a strike against its nuclear facilities. It is an Israeli priority that such a strike take place before US President George W. Bush leaves office in six months. Israel knows that a new American administration, Republican or Democrat, will not want to start its term by waging war on Iran. Israel also knows that it might lose White House support altogether on this issue if Barack Obama wins the presidency. So the coming six months are crucial for Israel if it wants to remove the Iranian threat. And if a strike is to be launched against Iran during this period, it is better that Iran's allies be entangled with Israel in negotiations that they have a stake in, in order that they might remain calm. Will Olmert's disappearance from the political scene have a negative effect on the current negotiating tracks? A mixed answer is most accurate: yes on the surface but no on substance since not much is expected to come out of them in the first place. Also, it all depends on how the machinations of Israeli politics deal with this issue in the coming couple of weeks. If a transition is managed smoothly within the ruling coalition and if the current composition of the cabinet survives then the effect will be rather minimal. But if the current Knesset is dissolved and early elections are scheduled, then the rhetoric of the coming election campaign might affect these negotiation tracks, at least on the surface. Not all those who talk will reach agreement. Israel has been dragging the Palestinians and Syrians into useless negotiations for many years now. There are no developments that would make us believe that any substantive change in the Israeli attitude has occurred. Therefore, it should be expected that Israel will continue its time-honored tactic of taking us all on an open-ended ride. Ali Jarbawi is professor of political science at Birzeit University. © bitterlemons.org
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